Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms (...) of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind–body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind–body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental properties. (shrink)

Many current problems surrounding science revolve around the complex epistemological framework that shapes a new vision of knowledge about reality. The traditional epistemological positions are characterized by the explanation of nature by means of concatenated facts; that is, as bricks attached to each other giving shape to the edifice of science. A conception of this nature showed that the idea of certainty was nothing more than a mere illusion, opening the way, on the contrary, to the idea of the uncertainty (...) of knowledge based on the descriptions of quantum physics, also a product of the non-reductionist conception of reality, thus criticizing the specular representation. This article addresses the main problems surrounding the critical conceptions that the emerging epistemology reveals about knowledge, pointing towards a much more complex vision of reality. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos enfocamos fundamentalmente en responder dos interrogantes: (a) ¿Pueden las mujeres ser sujetos ilustrados desde la perspectiva de Hume? y en caso de responder afirmativamente, (b) ¿resulta esta ilustración emancipatoria en términos feministas? En primer lugar, reconstruimos las principales líneas de interpretación feministas de la obra de Hume para ubicar nuestra propuesta dentro de una corriente interpretativa poco explorada aún. En segundo lugar, precisamos el sentido que puede adoptar la noción de “ilustración” en la filosofía de Hume, (...) en discusión con debates de la literatura secundaria contemporánea. En tercer lugar, orientamos nuestra reflexión a responder el primero de los interrogantes e indagamos si las mujeres están incluidas dentro de los rasgos ilustrados que podemos reconocer en el pensamiento de Hume y en qué condiciones. En cuarto y último lugar, ensayamos una respuesta al segundo interrogante: si aquello que podemos interpretar como ilustración femenina en clave humeana constituye una vía para la emancipación de la dominación patriarcal o si, por el contrario, refuerza el sometimiento de las mujeres. (shrink)

Reseña al libro "El hilo de Ariadna. Nuevas aproximaciones a la razón narrativa" del escritor y científico social, Vicente Huici. A lo largo del libro de Vicente Huici hay un reiterado llamado a mantener vivo el ejercicio de la memoria, colectiva e individual, como una forma de orientación y senti-do. Asimismo, del valor que tiene la narración en el proceso de vitalizar nuestra expe-riencia en el mundo. Por otro lado, esta última contribución del pensador vasco es un llamado (...) a seguir construyendo puentes de reflexión entre la filosofía, la literatura, las ciencias sociales y, evidentemente, con la vida cotidiana. Pues en este último espacio se desenvuelve lo que somos en el día a día. De este modo, El hilo de Ariadna. Nuevas aproximaciones a la razón narrativa, se presenta como una invitación a recuperar para la filosofía el modo expositivo y abierto de escribirla. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for an objectivist pluralist interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy. We begin by approaching the pluralist/relativist distinction in aesthetics. Then we move to ethics, and present some reasons which justify considering Hume a normative pluralist, and, in particular, an objectivist pluralist. Our argument will make use of Hume’s idea that there are foru sources of value, and of his notion of artificial lives/moralities.

Nosotres, biólogues, ecologistas y otres profesionales dedicados a proteger la vida, les escribimos con una solicitud urgente. Les pedimos muy comedidamente que su organización o institución emita un comunicado oficial condenando la crisis en curso y abordando los impactos ambientales y humanitarios en Palestina.

Inspired by Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, David J. Chalmers argues that the world can be constructed from a few basic elements. He develops a scrutability thesis saying that all truths about the world can be derived from basic truths and ideal reasoning. This thesis leads to many philosophical consequences: a broadly Fregean approach to meaning, an internalist approach to the contents of thought, and a reply to W. V. Quine's arguments against the analytic and the a (...) priori. Chalmers also uses scrutability to analyze the unity of science, to defend a conceptual approach to metaphysics, and to mount a structuralist response to skepticism. Based on the 2010 John Locke lectures, Constructing the World opens up debate on central philosophical issues involving language, consciousness, knowledge, and reality. This major work by a leading philosopher will appeal to philosophers in all areas. This entry contains uncorrected proofs of front matter, chapter 1, and first excursus. (shrink)

[This is an edited version of a keynote talk at the conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) on November 28, 2022, with some minor additions and subtractions.] -/- There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will break down the strongest reasons for and against. Given mainstream assumptions in the science of consciousness, there are significant obstacles to consciousness in current models: for example, their (...) lack of recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. At the same time, it is quite possible that these obstacles will be overcome in the next decade or so. I conclude that while it is somewhat unlikely that current large language models are conscious, we should take seriously the possibility that successors to large language models may be conscious in the not-too-distant future. (shrink)

The singularity hypothesis is a radical hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on scientifically implausible growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis (Chalmers 2010, Bostrom 2014) fail (...) to overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical implications of this discussion for our understanding of consciousness, personal identity, digital minds, existential risk, and ethical longtermism. GPI Working Paper No . 19-2022. (shrink)

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...) takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one's acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined. (shrink)

REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES EM ANIMAIS, E A INDÚSTRIA DE EMBRIÕES NO BRASIL -/- ANIMAL BREEDING: EMBRYO TRANSFER IN ANIMALS, AND THE EMBRYO INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 1. INTRODUÇÃO A técnica da inseminação artificial tornou possível aumentar o impacto na descendência de touros geneticamente superiores em termos de produção láctea das filhas. Com a transferência de embriões é possível aumentar o impacto da fêmea sobre (...) a população das filhas. A transferência de embriões data de 1890, ano em que Heape obteve o nascimento de coelhos transferindo ovócitos fecundados de uma fêmea para outra. A partir de 1930, é repetida uma série de experiências para desenvolver a técnica e aplicá-la em ovinos, caprinos (1934) e bovinos (1951) como espécies mais idôneas para a reprodução. A Inglaterra e os Estados Unidos estabeleceram as bases para o comércio de embriões durante os anos sessenta e setenta. De forma resumida, a transferência de embriões implica na estimulação da produção de ovócitos mediante a aplicação de hormônios: cerca de 6-8 dias após a cobrição dessas fêmeas ou da sua inseminação artificial, os óvulos fertilizados são extraídos dos órgãos genitais da fêmea doadora por perfusão ou lavagem com soluções biológicas controladas e testadas, originando-se uma deposição dos gametas fecundados nas fêmeas receptoras que serão encarregadas de levar adiante a gestação e o parto sem influência sobre as produções do novo indivíduo. 2. MANEJO DAS FÊMEAS DOADORAS É relativamente fácil obter um embrião, uma vez que pode origina-se a partir do cio natural das vacas cíclicas. No entanto, a fim de otimizar a técnica, o normal é «superovular» a fêmea doadora e obter um número superior de gametas fecundadas após cada lavagem ou perfusão das genitais. A maioria das fêmeas doadoras são tratadas com gonadotrofinas (PMSG) ou com hormônios estimuladores da foliculogênese (FSH). Estes hormônios invertem a atresia normal de folículos permitindo uma maturação, que em condições normais não se realizaria. O mecanismo exato do funcionamento destas hormonas não é totalmente claro. A superovulação multiplica por um fator de 10 o número de ovócitos recuperados no caso das vacas, ovelhas e cabras, mas apenas por um fator 2 ou 3 no caso das porcas. Existe um acordo geral sobre a utilização das gonadotrofinas; a PMSG deve ser aplicada durante a transição da fase luteica para a folicular, ou seja, no 16º dia do ciclo. As doses de gonadotrofinas variam entre 1500 e 3000 UI em bovinos, aumentando a resposta e a variabilidade individual com o aumento da dose. A resposta ao tratamento varia de acordo em função de diversos fatores. Neste contexto, merecem especial atenção a espécie, a raça, a época e a conformação corporal do animal, bem como o lote de fabricação da preparação hormonal (quadro 7.1). Estudos demonstram que, nos bovinos, as raças de corte respondem melhor ao tratamento do que as raças leiteiras. Tabela 1: Doses de gonadotrofinas em UI -/- Espécie Dia do ciclo Crescimento folicular_ ___ PMSG FSH Ovulação _____ PMSG FSH Bovinos 8 – 10 1500 – 3000 20 – 50 1500 – 2000 75 – 200 Caprinos 16 – 17 1000 – 1500 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Ovinos 12 – 14 1000 – 2000 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Suínos 15 – 17 750 – 1500 10 – 20 500 – 1000 25 – 50 Coelhos — 25 – 75 2 – 3 25 – 75 2 – 3 Fonte: HAFEZ, 2004. O FSH também é utilizado para superovulação em várias espécies. Nos ovinos, injetam-se 2 mg desta hormona 12 horas antes da retirada das esponjas, aplicando-se mais três injeções, com um intervalo de 12 horas, até 24 horas após a retirada das esponjas, o que corresponde a um total de 8 mg de FSH injetados por tratamento e animal. Às vezes, e dependendo do país, existem dificuldades para a obtenção desse hormônio em condições de pureza adequada para que o tratamento proporcione o resultado esperado. Nas vacas dadoras devem ter passado mais de 50 dias após o último parto: também ser animais cíclicos, encontrar-se num nível nutricional elevado e em aumento, sem deficiências especificas alimentares. Existe uma indicação de suplementação das fêmeas doadoras com minerais essenciais antes do tratamento. 3. OBTENÇÃO DE EMBRIÕES Uma vez as fêmeas doadoras inseminadas, entre o sexto e o oitavo dia, procede-se a coleta dos embriões. Para isso, atualmente se utilizam cateteres de obtenção transcervical (tipo Foley, Rusch. etc.) munidos de uma bola insuflável na sua extremidade que permite criar um compartimento estanque na parte distal do córneo uterino e proceder ao arrasto dos embriões ali localizados. Para obter esta «lavagem» utiliza-se uma solução aquosa tamponada: o meio mais frequentemente utilizado é o tampão fosfato salino (PBS: pH = 7; PO = 280 - 290 mOsm/kg) suplementado com antibióticos e proteínas. Depois de recuperado o meio de lavagem, os embriões devem ser isolados do volume total, avaliados segundo critérios do Manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões de acordo com seu estado de desenvolvimento. Código numérico para determinar o grau de desenvolvimento embrionário: N° 1: ovócito não fertilizado ou embrião de uma célula (1 dia). N° 2: Identifica embriões com 2 a 16 células (2-4 dias). N° 3: Identifica mórulas adiantadas (5-6 dias). N° 4: Identifica mórulas compactas de 6 dias de idade. N° 5: blastocisto adiantado (7 dias). N° 6: blastocisto (7-8 dias). N° 7: blastocisto expandido (8-9 dias). N° 8: blastocisto eclodido (9 dias) a partir do nono ou décimo dia o blastocisto já está fora da zona pelúcida. Além da classificação por estado de desenvolvimento, a referida Sociedade Internacional estabeleceu uma categorização dos embriões com base na qualidade dos mesmos. Assim os denomina: 1: excelente; 2: bom; 3: regular; 4: degenerado. Segundo as investigações de diversos autores especialistas no tema não devem ser transferidos embriões que não tenham sido classificados como excelentes ou bons. A obtenção dos embriões pode ser realizada em uma clínica, em unidades móveis especializadas, ou na própria fazenda. Em todo o caso, a doadora não deve apresentar quaisquer sintomas clínicos de doença, sendo esta responsabilidade direta do veterinário. O rebanho de onde provém a doadora deve estar livre de medidas cautelares sanitárias. Os técnicos devem estar adequadamente limpos e preparados para esta atuação, em um lugar tranquilo e que permita a colocação de equipamentos e material em condições limpas e seguras. 4. TÉCNICAS DE TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES Recomenda-se que os embriões sejam transferidos o mais rápido possível depois da recuperação. A fêmea receptora deve apresentar um ambiente uterino o mais semelhante possível ao da fêmea doadora. Isto quer dizer que a receptora também será mantida num sistema de sincronização para que coincida o mais possível o estágio de desenvolvimento embrionário com seu correspondente estado uterino. A margem de assincronia para evitar efeitos indesejáveis é de ± 24 horas. Os métodos hormonais de sincronização são análogos aos das doadoras. As técnicas para a deposição dos embriões no seu novo habitat podem ser igualmente cirúrgicas e não cirúrgicas, mas devido aos problemas do uso de anestésicos em técnicas cirúrgicas, as transferências foram direcionadas para modelos não-cirúrgicos ou transcervicais. Este método é baseado na utilização do colo uterino de forma análoga como é realizada na inseminação artificial. Devido às relações entre o embrião e o ovário, as porcentagens de fertilidade são aumentadas ao serem depositadas no corno ipsilateral no ovário que se encontra ativo. A utilização desta técnica implica na obtenção de mais fêmeas gestantes. O uso de novilhas como fêmeas receptoras aumenta também a taxa de gestações a partir de uma maior facilidade de manejo, uniformidade na resposta hormonal e um custo mais baixo. O fator humano ou habilidade do técnico que realiza esta técnica também constitui um fator que influencia decisivamente no êxito da transferência, encontrando-se variações de 20 a 60% devidas a este fator. 5. CONTROLES SANITÁRIOS Com a utilização da inseminação artificial, verificou-se que, embora as tecnologias reprodutivas colaborativas fossem mais avançadas em termos de técnicas destinadas a aumentar a produtividade individual, da mesma forma, podem constituir um perigo de contaminação e de dispersão de doenças estrangeiras para o grupo ou rebanho para onde são transferidos os novos genes. Neste contexto, a transferência embrionária (TE) deve realizar-se tendo em conta os riscos que pode implicar uma manipulação inadequada. Uma vez mais, a Sociedade Internacional (IETS) na Reunião Regional da OIE (Oficina Internacional de Epizootias) estabeleceu as normas em 1985 para que a TE pudesse ser utilizada como meio para controle de doenças na pecuária. Para que a utilização da TE se realize sem risco para a saúde, é necessário ter em conta um certo número de regras e condições específicas que evitem os riscos de contaminação. O embrião está separado do meio externo por três barreiras de proteção: o corpo da mãe, o útero por si só e a terceira, e mais importante, pela zona pelúcida, a qual nos animais domésticos tem demonstrado ser totalmente impermeável a qualquer elemento patogênico, desde que fique intacta. Portanto, o risco de contaminação dos embriões pode vir por duas vias diferentes: a) Fatores extrínsecos - por invasão dos agentes patogênicos na cavidade uterina principalmente. Isto está relacionado com o estado sanitário médio do país, região ou rebanho de origem. b) Fatores intrínsecos - Segundo Thibier podemos considerar diferentes fontes potenciais de contaminação, que segundo o risco sanitário se classificam nas seguintes ordens: 1° Zigoto. 2° Penetração. 3° Absorção. 4° Armazenamento. 5° Exame. 6° Transferência. Os esforços para que os embriões se tornem livres de contaminação devem ser semelhantes aos que são efetuados com os animais vivos e com as doses seminais. O momento mais perigoso encontra-se entre a coleta das células fecundadas e a sua deposição, após seu exame, no trato reprodutivo da receptora. As condições em que o referido processo deve ser realizado encontram-se detalhadas no manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS). 6. REGRAS DA IETS A transferência de embriões é a via mais segura para a troca de genes. No entanto, os técnicos devem esforçar-se por manter todas as regras e normas sanitárias para que a coleta e a manipulação dos embriões se realizem sob condições de absoluta garantia higiênica e sanitária. A transferência embrionária implica, pela primeira vez na história da medicina veterinária, que a vigilância sanitária não se aplica estritamente ao animal, uma vez que, na sua fase "in vitro", está inteiramente sob o controle do técnico. Por conseguinte, não haverá futuro para este tipo de biotecnologia se, paralelamente, não houver um elevado nível de garantia de que não «servirá» para não disseminar ou difundir doenças. As conclusões da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS) na sua reunião anual de 14 de Janeiro de 1992 estabelecem, tendo em conta a revisão efetuada em 1991 pela Subdireção de Investigação e pelo Comitê de Importação e Exportação, uma classificação das doenças. Esta classificação corresponde às seguintes categorias: Categoria 1 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas suficientes para afirmar que o risco de transmissão é negligenciável, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência: a) Leucose bovina enzoótica. b) Febre aftosa (bovinos). c) Língua azul (bovinos). d) Brucelose bovina. e) Rintraqueíte infecciosa bovina. f) Doença de Aujeszky. Categoria 2 - Doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas substanciais que indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para as quais é necessário verificar os dados existentes através de novas transferências: a) Peste suína clássica. Categoria 3 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais os resultados preliminares indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados, entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para os quais essas verificações preliminares devem ser corroboradas por dados experimentais complementares "in vitro" e "in vivo": a) Peste bovina. b) Diarreia viral bovina. c) Língua azul (ovinos). d) Febre aftosa (suínos, ovelhas e cabras). e) Campylobacter fetus (ovinos). f) Doença vesicular do porco. g) Peste suína africana. h) Prurido lombar (ovinos). i) Haemophilus somnus. Categoria 4 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças que foram ou são objeto de trabalhos preliminares: a) Vírus Akabane (bovino). b) Estomatite vesicular (bovinos e suínos). c) Chlamydia psittaci (bovinos e suínos). d) Ureaplasma/micoplasmose (bovinos e caprinos). e) Maedi-visna (ovino). f) Adenomatosa pulmonar (ovino). g) Prurido lombar (caprinos). h) Língua azul (caprinos). i) Artrite e encefalite caprina. j) Parvovírus (suíno). k) Enterovírus (bovinos e suínos). I) Leptospirose (suíno). m) Herpesvírus 4 dos bovinos. n) Mycobacterium paratuberculose (bovinos). o) brucelose ovina. p) Doença de Border (ovinos). q) Vírus parainfluenza 3 (bovinos). r) Agente da encefalopatia espongiforme bovina. É interessante salientar que apenas seis doenças estão incluídas na categoria 1 (a mais segura). Isso não significa que as outras doenças tenham um risco maior, apenas indica que o risco de transmissão das doenças da categoria 1 é irrelevante, estatisticamente falando. É importante assinalar que as doenças mais importantes dos bovinos se situam na categoria 1. Isto significa que a incidência do embrião patogênico nos bovinos parece ser perfeitamente controlável, desde que sejam adotadas metodologias adequadas. Isto serve também como linha de defesa adicional para que o técnico centre sua atenção e cuidados entre a fase de obtenção e a de transferência. 7. SITUAÇÃO ATUAL DA TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES ANIMAIS NO BRASIL O Brasil é um dos grandes responsáveis mundiais pela implantação da tecnologia na reprodução animal, sendo assim, o país conseguiu inserir-se no mercado internacional como um dos maiores produtores de embriões in vivo e in vitro. Nas últimas duas décadas, especialmente entre os anos de 1997 e 2017 o país passou por importantes transformações nesse segmento, dentre essas transformações vale destacar a posição relativa do Brasil no contexto mundial. O Brasil passou de referência regional, nos anos 1990, para se tornar o maior produtor mundial de embriões entre os anos 2012 e 2013, sendo líder no uso e na produção de embriões in vitro. Os primeiros registros da TE produzidos in vivo no Brasil datam da década de 1980, e uma década depois o país já tornara-se referência e detinha um mercado consolidado de produção e TE na espécie bovina. Não obstante, no ano de 1997 o país ainda era referência apenas no contexto regional, detendo 68,3% dos embriões transferidos na América Latina, esse percentual corresponde a 24.085 embriões de um total de 35.254 produzidos na América Latina. Esse percentual regional representa apenas 6,6% de toda a produção mundial de embriões in vivo, que produziu, em 1997, 360.656 embriões in vivo. Nos últimos anos, o mercado de embriões, principalmente o bovino, teve retração moderada de -2,5% ao ano entre 2003 e 2018, porém essa retração contrasta com o ligeiro crescimento observado a partir dos anos 2000 conforme figura 1: Figura 1: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil no período 1996-2018, total e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo[IVD] ou in vitro [IVP]). Em 2018, o mercado de embriões bovinos manteve-se inalterado se compararmos com os três anos anteriores, houve reduções nós segmentos de corte, leite e no total comparado ao ano de 2017. Em 2014, a produção de embriões para melhoramento do gado leiteiro teve seu ápice, porém de lá para cá esse mercado manteve-se estagnado como demonstra a tabela 2. Tabela 2: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil em 2018, estratificada por segmento e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo ou in vitro). 7.1 Crise, economia e mercado de embriões A indústria de embriões reflete, em maior ou menor grau, o momento da economia brasileira. Apesar do segmento agropecuário ser um setor em constante crescimento no país, ao qual, sem dúvidas, em meio a inúmeras crises mantém-se em constante crescimento. Porém vale ressaltar que esse mercado é emergente e está refletido em paralelo com os bens produzidos pelo país, como demonstra a figura 2. Figura 2: Produção de embriões bovinos e variação no produto interno bruto (PIB) no Brasil, no período 1996-2018. Cada vez mais o setor agropecuário do Brasil investe em novas tecnologias que maximizem o mercado e que melhore a produção dos animais seja no segmento corte ou leite. Segundo a OCDE, 1997, essa indústria da produção de embriões é um conjunto de novas técnicas e processos, frutos do desenvolvimento técnico-científico, que chega ao mercado e - o mais importante - o transforma. Logo, todas essas técnicas e biotecnologias visam, além da alta produção e do lucro, o melhoramento e a suplementação alimentícia da população mundial que está em crescente avanço. A evolução da tecnologia embrionária no país, seja para o melhoramento dos equinos para os esportes como as vaquejadas, hipismo, corridas, etc., onde são investidos tempo, dedicação e dinheiro para formar um novo animal que apresente força, conformação, conversão alimentar e que custa milhões, em muitos casos, não só dos equinos, mas também dos caprinos, ovinos, suínos e até mesmo os bovinos onde o mercado da TE é mais presente e aquecida, venceu os estigmas do “modismo” e o chamado “elitismo”, porém deve enfrentar novos desafios, em especial num contexto de forte concentração do mercado de genética e de concorrência globalizada. Mesmo com todos esses avanços e retrocessos, essa relativização dos números demonstra que um percentual bastante reduzido das fêmeas bovinas que estão em idade reprodutiva é utilizado para a técnica da transferência de embriões, e que o mercado brasileiro ainda tem um grande potencial de crescimento no setor de produção in vivo e in vitro. 8. RESUMO E PRIMEIRAS CONCLUSÕES Ao longo deste trabalho pretendi realizar uma revisão sumária sobre um tema de grande importância presente, e sobretudo futura; referir-me à transferência embrionária. Atualmente, esta técnica atingiu um grau notável de penetração, a nível prático, no gado leiteiro. No entanto, num futuro mais ou menos longínquo, não temos dúvidas quanto a esta técnica, pelas vantagens indubitáveis que apresenta a nível de avanço genético, que será aplicada em outras espécies úteis ao homem. Na minha exposição, tentei dar especial ênfase a dois aspectos: as técnicas de transferência, incluindo as normas IETS e os controles sanitários a serem efetuados. Por fim, a indústria brasileira de embriões mostrou-se em retrocessos e avanços, porém o mercado ainda têm grandes desafios a serem enfrentados ao longo dos anos, mas que serão sanados mediante as técnicas desenvolvidas pelos inúmeros centros de pesquisa embrionárias e seus especialistas. -/- Realização -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE. Recife, 2020. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BALL, Peter JH; PETERS, Andy R. Reproduction in cattle. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. BARUSELLI, Pietro Sampaio et al. Sêmen sexado: inseminação artificial e transferência de embriões. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 3, p. 374-381, 2007. BRACKELL, B. G.; JR SEIDEL, G. E.; SEIDEL, S. Avances en zootecnia nuevas técnicas de reproducción animal. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1988. COLE, H. H.; CUPPS, P. T. Reproduction in domestic animals. 1ª ed. Londres: Academic Press, 1977. CURTIS, John L. et al. Cattle embryo transfer procedure. An instruction manual for the rancher, dairyman, artificial insemination technician, animal scientist, and veterinarian. Londres: Academic Press, Inc., 1991. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Fecundação e Gestação. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DE LA FUENTE, J. Manipulación de embriones en ganado vacuno. Bovis, n. 58, p. 51-61, 1994. GIBBONS, A.; CUETO, M. Manual de transferencia de embriones ovinos y caprinos. Bariloche: Inta, 2013. GONÇALVES, Paulo Bayard Dias; DE FIGUEIREDO, José Ricardo; DE FIGUEIRÊDO FREITAS, Vicente José. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. São Paulo: Editora Roca, 2008. GONÇALVES, Rômany Louise Ribeiro; VIANA, João Henrique Moreira. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia-Artigo em anais de congresso (ALICE). Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 2, p. 156-159, abr./jun. 2019., 2019. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. PÉREZ PÉREZ, F.; PÉREZ GUTIÉRREZ, F. Reproducción animal, inseminación animal y transplante de embriones. Barcelona: Cientifico-medica, 1985. MANSOUR, R. T.; ABOULGHAR, M. A. Optimizing the embryo transfer technique. Human reproduction, v. 17, n. 5, p. 1149-1153, 2002. MARTINS, Carlos Frederico. O impacto da transferência de embriões e da fecundação in vitro na produção de bovinos no Brasil. Embrapa Cerrados-Artigo de divulgação na mídia (INFOTECA-E), 2010. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS MCKINNON, A. O.; SQUIRES, E. L. Equine embryo transfer. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Equine Practice, v. 4, n. 2, p. 305-333, 1988. PALMA, G. A.; BREM, G. Transferencia de los embriones. GA Palma & G. Brem. Transferencia de embriones y biotecnología de la reproducción en la especie bovina. Ed. Hemisferio Sur. Buenos Aires, Argentina, p. 143-161, 1993. SCHOOLCRAFT, William B.; SURREY, Eric S.; GARDNER, David K. Embryo transfer: techniques and variables affecting success. Fertility and sterility, v. 76, n. 5, p. 863-870, 2001. SEIDEL, George E. Superovulation and embryo transfer in cattle. Science, v. 211, n. 4480, p. 351-358, 1981. STRINGFELLOW, D. A.; SEIDEL, S. M. Manual of IETS. Savoy IL: IETS, p. 103-130, 1998. STRINGFELLOW, D. A. Manual da sociedade internacional de transferência de embriões. Brasília: Sociedade Brasileira de Transferência de Embriões (SBTE), 1999. THIBIER, M.; NIBART, M. Disease control and embryo importations. Theriogenology, v. 27, n. 1, p. 37-47, 1987. VIANA, J. H. M. Produção e transferência de embriões bovinos em 2018. In: Jornal o embrião. Edição 64, ano 33. Brasília: SBTE, 2019. -/- . (shrink)

Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by experiments with (...) quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...) illuminating account requires elements of both views. Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but they are abnormal because asymbolics are. I agree with Klein that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal threat, but also their indifference to pain, we must do the following: (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of their pains’ missing a component, and (ii) claim that the missing component consists in evaluative content. Asymbolia, I conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant pain is composite, but that its ‘hedomotive component’ is evaluative. (shrink)

Epistemologists have recently proposed a number of norms governing rational inquiry. My aim in this paper is to unify and explain recently proposed norms of inquiry by developing a general account of the conditions under which inquiries are rational, analogous to theories such as evidentialism and reliabilism for rational belief. I begin with a reason-responsiveness conception of rationality as responding correctly to possessed normative reasons. I extend this account with a series of claims about the normative reasons for inquiry that (...) we possess. I apply the account to shed light on two classes of norms that have featured prominently in recent discussions: norms of clutter avoidance forbidding agents from engaging in trivial inquiries, and norms of logical non-omniscience governing properties such as the deductive closure and consistency of an agent's belief state. I conclude with a discussion of the sense in which norms of inquiry should be regarded as epistemic norms. (shrink)

This article uses the case study of ethnobiological classification to develop a positive and a negative thesis about the state of natural kind debates. On the one hand, I argue that current accounts of natural kinds can be integrated in a multidimensional framework that advances understanding of classificatory practices in ethnobiology. On the other hand, I argue that such a multidimensional framework does not leave any substantial work for the notion “natural kind” and that attempts to formulate a general account (...) of naturalness have become an obstacle to understanding classificatory practices. (shrink)

Political fact-checkers evaluate the truthfulness of politicians’ claims. This paper contributes to an emerging scholarly debate on whether fact-checkers treat political parties differently in a systematic manner depending on their ideology (bias). We first examine the available approaches to analyze bias and then present a new approach in two steps. First, we propose a logistic regression model to analyze the outcomes of fact-checks and calculate how likely each political party will obtain a truth score. We test our model with a (...) sample of fact-checks from Newtral, a major Spanish fact-checker. Our model would signal bias under two assumptions: a) all political parties are on average equally accurate in their statements; b) the verification method gives precise instructions and is implemented systematically. We investigate this second assumption with a series of interviews with Newtral fact-checkers. We show that standard verification protocols are so loosely implemented that fact-checks reflect a set of journalistic decisions, rather than a bias in the statistical sense. We call for a more rigorous definition of verification methods as a pre-requisite for an unbiased assessment of politician’s claims. (shrink)

I argue that according to Socrates in the Phaedo we should not merely evaluate bodily pleasures and desires as worthless or bad, but actively avoid them. We need to avoid them because they change our values and make us believe falsehoods. This change in values and acceptance of falsehoods undermines the soul’s proper activity, making virtue and happiness impossible for us. I situate this account of why we should avoid bodily pleasures within Plato’s project in the Phaedo of providing Pythagorean (...) and Orphic ideas with clearer meanings and better justifications. (shrink)

In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections.

Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, (...) externalism, and coherentism. I argue that a more powerful veridicalist response to global skepticism can be motivated by structuralism, on which physical entities are understood as those that play a certain structural role. I develop the structuralist response and address objections. (shrink)

Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.

This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages.

There are two versions of the language-of-thought hypothesis (LOT): Representational LOT (roughly, structured representation), introduced by Ockham, and computational LOT (roughly, symbolic computation) introduced by Fodor. Like many others, I oppose the latter but not the former. Quilty-Dunn et al. defend representational LOT, but they do not defend the strong computational LOT thesis central to the classical-connectionist debate.

A new wave of evidentialist theorizing concedes that evidentialism may be extensionally incorrect as an account of all-things-considered rational belief. Nevertheless, these _newer evidentialists_ maintain that there is an importantly distinct type of epistemic rationality about which evidentialism may be the correct account. I argue that natural ways of developing the newer evidentialist position face opposite problems. One version, due to Christensen (Philos Phenomenol Res 103:501–517, 2021), may correctly describe what rationality requires, but does not entail the existence of a (...) distinctively epistemic type of rationality. Another version, due to Maguire and Woods (Philos Rev 129:211–249, 2020), characterizes a normative concept that is both distinct and epistemic, but struggles to explain why this concept should be classified as a type of rationality. I conclude that the newer evidentialist strategy of extensional compromise may be less favorable to evidentialism than previously supposed. (shrink)

This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, one’s prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and (...) may indeed serve to correct, the informal understanding and applications of the RSA criteria concerning their conceptual dependence, their function as update-thresholds, and their status as obligatory rather than permissive norms, but also show how these formal and informal normative approachs can in fact align. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory’s associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to ‘knowledge’ means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role (...) ascribed to knowledge by the theory, but argues that this knowledge can and should be identified with bodily skill rather than representation. Making the further argument that the notion of ‘representation hunger’ can be replaced with ‘prima facie representation hunger’, it concludes that although the theory could optionally be developed scientifically in part by reference to internal representation, it makes a strong and natural fit with anti-representationalist embodied or enactive cognitive science. (shrink)

Critical race theorists and standpoint epistemologists argue that agents who are members of dominant social groups are often in a state of ignorance about the extent of their social dominance, where this ignorance is explained by these agents' membership in a socially dominant group (e.g., Mills 2007). To illustrate this claim bluntly, it is argued: 1) that many white men do not know the extent of their social dominance, 2) that they remain ignorant as to the extent of their dominant (...) social position even where this information is freely attainable, and 3) that this ignorance is due in part to the fact that they are white men. We argue that on Buchak's (2010, 2013) model of risk averse instrumental rationality, ignorance of one's privileges can be rational. This argument yields a new account of elite-group ignorance, why it may occur, and how it might be alleviated. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and (...) anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations). (shrink)

Eleanor Knox has argued that our concept of spacetime applies to whichever structure plays a certain functional role in the laws (the role of determining local inertial structure). I raise two complications for this approach. First, our spacetime concept seems to have the structure of a cluster concept, which means that Knox's inertial criteria for spacetime cannot succeed with complete generality. Second, the notion of metaphysical fundamentality may feature in the spacetime concept, in which case spacetime functionalism may be uninformative (...) in the absence of answers to fundamental metaphysical questions like the substantivalist/relationist debate. (shrink)

Pharmaceutical paternalism is the normative stance upheld by pharmaceutical regulatory agencies like the US Food and Drug Administration. These agencies prevent patients from accessing treatments declared safe and ineffective for the patient’s good without their consent. Libertarian critics of the FDA have shown a number of significant flaws in regulatory paternalism. Against these objections, I will argue that, in order to make an informed decision about treatments, a libertarian patient should request full disclosure of the uncertainty about an experimental treatment. (...) But pharmaceutical markets, on their own, are not a reliable source of information about such uncertainty. And companies have the power to capture any independent expert who may assess it. Therefore, the libertarian is better off deferring on an independent regulatory body the assessment of the pharmaceutical risks, constraining access to treatments until tested. (shrink)

If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...) in this paper is the question whether the phenomenal theory can account for the apparently abstract and complex cognitive contents of "high-level" thoughts. It might seem dubious that the theory can account for such cognitive contents, because cognitive phenomenology is too scarce and too thin. However, I argue there are in fact few abstract or complex cognitive contents, so the phenomenal theory's predictions are correct. This position explains some apparently irrational behavior that is otherwise hard to explain, and it makes sense of the central role of inner speech and other forms of consciousness in reasoning. (shrink)

Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is (...) both free-standing and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive method for identifying the premises of mathematics. (shrink)

Corruptionism is the view that following physical death, the human being ceases to exist but their soul persists in the afterlife. Survivalism holds that both the human being and their soul persist in the afterlife, as distinct entities, with the soul constituting the human. Each position has its defenders, most of whom appeal both to metaphysical considerations and to the authority of St Thomas Aquinas. Corruptionists claim that survivalism violates a basic principle of any plausible mereology, while survivalists tend to (...) reject the principle, though without as much detail as one would like. In this paper I examine both the key exegetical issues and the mereological question, arguing that Aquinas cannot be shown to have supported the principle in question, and that the principle should be rejected on independent grounds. If correct, some key planks in support of survivalism are established, with others to await further examination. (shrink)

The objective of this essay is to provide the beginning of a principled classification of some of the ways space is intelligently used. Studies of planning have typically focused on the temporal ordering of action, leaving as unaddressed questions of where to lay down instruments, ingredients, work-in-progress, and the like. But, in having a body, we are spatially located creatures: we must always be facing some direction, have only certain objects in view, be within reach of certain others. How we (...) manage the spatial arrangement of items around us is not an afterthought: it is an integral part of the way we think, plan, and behave. The proposed classification has three main categories: spatial arrangements that simplify choice; spatial arrangements that simplify perception; and spatial dynamics that simplify internal computation. The data for such a classification is drawn from videos of cooking, assembly and packing, everyday observations in supermarkets, workshops and playrooms, and experimental studies of subjects playing Tetris, the computer game. This study, therefore, focuses on interactive processes in the medium and short term: on how agents set up their workplace for particular tasks, and how they continuously manage that workplace. (shrink)

This paper explores an initially attractive principle connecting beliefs in general with beliefs about what beliefs are rational. The principle turns out to be violated by intuitively rational beliefs in some situations. The paper lays out some options for reacting to this fact.

What role, if any, should our moral intuitions play in moral epistemology? We make, or are prepared to make, moral judgments about a variety of actual and hypothetical situations. Some of these moral judgments are more informed, reflective, and stable than others (call these ourconsideredmoral judgments); some we make more confidently than others; and some, though not all, are judgments about which there is substantial consensus. What bearing do our moral judgments have on philosophical ethics and the search for first (...) principles in ethics? Should these judgments constrain, or be constrained by, philosophical theorizing about morality? On the one hand, we might expect first principles to conform to our moral intuitions or at least to our considered moral judgments. After all, we begin the reflection that may lead to first principles from particular moral convictions. And some of our moral intuitions (e.g., that genocide is wrong) are more fixed and compelling than any putative first principle. If so, we might expect common moral beliefs to have an important evidential role in the construction and assessment of first principles. On the other hand, common moral beliefs often rest on poor information, reflect bias, or are otherwise mistaken. We often appeal to moral principles to justify our particular moral convictions or to resolve our disagreements. Insofar as this is true, we may expect first principles to provide a foundation on the basis of which to test common moral beliefs and, where necessary, form new moral convictions. (shrink)

The strongest arguments for the permissibility of geoengineering (also known as climate engineering) rely implicitly on non-ideal theory—roughly, the theory of justice as applied to situations of partial compliance with principles of ideal justice. In an ideally just world, such arguments acknowledge, humanity should not deploy geoengineering; but in our imperfect world, society may need to complement mitigation and adaptation with geoengineering to reduce injustices associated with anthropogenic climate change. We interpret research proponents’ arguments as an application of a particular (...) branch of non-ideal theory known as “clinical theory.” Clinical theory aims to identify politically feasible institutions or policies that would address existing (or impending) injustice without violating certain kinds of moral permissibility constraints. We argue for three implications of clinical theory: First, conditional on falling costs and feasibility, clinical theory provides strong support for some geoengineering techniques that aim to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Second, if some kinds of carbon dioxide removal technologies are supported by clinical theory, then clinical theory further supports using those technologies to enable “overshoot” scenarios in which developing countries exceed the cumulative emissions caps that would apply in ideal circumstances. Third, because of tensions between political feasibility and moral permissibility, clinical theory provides only weak support for geoengineering techniques that aim to manage incoming solar radiation. (shrink)

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political ideal (...) presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals. (shrink)

Debiasing procedures are experimental methods aimed at correcting errors arising from the cognitive biases of the experimenter. We discuss two of these methods, the predesignation rule and randomization, showing to what extent they are open to the experimenter’s regress: there is no metarule to prove that, after implementing the procedure, the experimental data are actually free from biases. We claim that, from a contractarian perspective, these procedures are nonetheless defensible since they provide a warrant of the impartiality of the experiment: (...) we only need proof that the result has not been intentionally manipulated for prima facie acceptance. (shrink)

Political philosophers frequently claim that political ideals can provide normative guidance for unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances. This is mistaken. This paper demonstrates that political ideals contribute nothing to our understanding of the normative principles we should satisfy amidst unjust or otherwise nonideal circumstances.

In a study that goes beyond the ego affirmed by Freudian psychology, David Levin offers an account of personal growth and self-fulfillment based on the development of our capacity for listening. Drawing on the work of Dewey, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg, he uses the vocabulary of phenomenological psychology to distinguish four stages in this developmental process and brings us the significance of these stages for music, psychotherapy, ethics, politics, and ecology. This analysis substantiates his claim that the development of (...) our listening capacity is a process that fits Foucault's conception of a practice of the self, forming our character as social beings and moral agents. David Levin contends that our self- development as auditory beings is necessary for the achievement of a just and democratic society. (shrink)

It is conventional wisdom among political philosophers that ideal principles of justice must guide our attempts to design institutions to avert actual injustice. Call this the ideal guidance approach. I argue that this view is misguided— ideal principles of justice are not appropriate "guiding principles" that actual institutions must aim to realize, even if only approximately. Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is also avoidable. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to institutional design, which I call institutional failure analysis. The (...) basic intuition of this approach is that our moral assessment of institutional proposals is most effective when we proceed from a detailed understanding of the causal processes generating problematic social outcomes. Failure analysis takes the institutional primary design task to be obviating or averting institutional failures. Consequently, failure analysis enables theorists to prescribe more effective solutions to actual injustice because its focuses on understanding the injustice, rather than specifying an ideal of justice. (shrink)

One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by (...) David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. I suggest that this debate can be avoided: divine foreknowledge is itself aparadigmatic counterexample to PAP, requiring no support from suspect Frankfurt counterexamples. (shrink)

A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...) lemonade. The adoption of such an ontology reduces the justificatory force of commonsense, which is key in arguing that we are animals and that we persist as long as we are biologically alive. With this loss of justification comes the loss of a high level of confidence that Quinn-pre-dementia’s lethal advanced directive applies to Quinn-post-dementia, via identity. If we do not have a high level of confidence that Quinn-pre-dementia’s advanced directive applies to Quinn-post- dementia, then it is not enough (on its own) to let Quinn-post-dementia die. (shrink)

There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular (...) type of causal cognition; the extant data do not warrant any wide-ranging conclusions about the pervasiveness of normative considerations in causal cognition. Of course, almost all empirical investigations involve some manner of ampliative inference, and so we provide novel empirical results demonstrating that there are types of causal cognition that do not seem to be influenced by moral considerations. (shrink)

This chapter develops Moral Occasionalism, according to which moral facts are grounded in certain natural facts, which are called sub-moral grounds, and these sub-moral grounds influence us in such a way as to induce largely correct moral beliefs. Moral Occasionalism is designed to explain the correlation of moral beliefs with the moral facts—and to do so in a way that is consistent with non-interactionist views, according to which moral facts neither influence nor are influenced by moral beliefs. It is argued (...) that moral non-naturalists and others who are committed to non-interactionist views ought to be in the business of defending Moral Occasionalism. The chapter shows that Moral Occasionalism has major advantages over its chief non-interactionist rival, namely David Enoch’s “godless pre-established harmony” view. The chapter anticipates and responds to several objections. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form F a ∧ ¬F a, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a borderline contradiction. Many theories (...) of vague language have entailments about borderline contradictions; correctly describing the behavior of borderline contradictions is one of the many tasks facing anyone offering a theory of vague language. Here, I first briefly review claims made by various theorists about these borderline contradictions, attempting to draw out some predictions about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Second, I present an experiment intended to gather relevant data about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Finally, I discuss the experimental results in light of several different theories of vagueness, to see what explanations are available. My conclusions are necessarily tentative; I do not attempt to use the present experiment to demonstrate that any single theory is incontrovertibly true. Rather, I try to sketch the auxiliary hypotheses that would need to be conjoined to several extant theories of vague language to predict the present result, and offer some considerations regarding the plausibility of these various hypotheses. In the end, I conclude that two of the theories I consider are better-positioned to account for the observed data than are the others. But the field of logically-informed research on people’s actual responses to vague predicates is young; surely as more data come in we will learn a great deal more about which (if any) of these theories best accounts for the behavior of ordinary speakers. (shrink)